The risk in the Gaza War is not World War III, it is in thinking it amounts to World War III, by Dr. John C. Hulsman
Beware the neoconservative fairy tale of looking for simple answers to complicated questions
In May 1953, at a Coronation luncheon in Westminster Hall in honor of Elizabeth II coming to the throne, Winston Churchill offered a young American student the best of advice. When asked how he could come to understand the world, the greatest man of the Twentieth Century replied, ‘Study history, study history. In history lie all the secrets of statecraft.’
There is absolutely no doubt that Churchill was on the money about this. My global political risk firm has sprung to prominence almost entirely as a result of using the practical historical prism of the lived experience of humans across time, rather than the overly theoretical impulses of our political science rivals. But historical analogies, much like operating heavy machinery, must be handled with care, as all too often they are used to advocate ruinous foreign policies.
We have seen this horror movie before. In Iraq, the doleful appeasement of the 1930s was used to disastrously justify an intellectual magic trick conflating the very different. Suddenly, al-Qaeda (religious fundamentalists, committed to a regional if not global caliphate) were awkwardly lumped together with Saddam Hussein’s Baathists (pan-Arab, secular, socialists) as if they were all members of some sort of coherent anti-American club, much like SPECTRE in the James Bond films.
In vain, I argued against this bogus conflation, so beloved of the neo-conservatives and their liberal hawk allies, at the highest levels of government in the early to mid-2000s. But my policy rivals had one great advantage. In over-simplifying the complicated, they diverted our callow president from his initial proper focus on al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of 9/11, to instead commence the disastrous war in Iraq, as though this had anything to do with the twin towers. So began the ‘forever war’ there, which left Iran relatively strengthened, indirectly led to the rise of the ghastly ISIS, cost thousands of American lives and over a trillion dollars. To put it mildly, this historical error was not a little mistake.
Now (and it is incredible they have no shame, given their dire political risk analytical record) some of the same people are back once again, gravely telling us that the wars in Ukraine, Gaza and tensions over Taiwan are all part of one huge conflict, the incipient stages of World War III. While this may be comforting to the simple-minded, such a ‘one size fits all’ reading of the world amounts to yet another dangerous liberty taken with history.
Here are the similarities. Yes, China, Russia, and Iran/Hezbollah/Hamas all chafe at the still American-dominated world. Due to this, they are diplomatically closer to one another than they are to the west in general and America in particular. But this one, overarching similarity obscures far more than it reveals.
China and Russia are ‘frenemies’ at best, competing for influence for decades now directly in Central Asia, and even in Russia’s Siberian backyard. Both Beijing and Moscow grapple with ‘the Batman problem’ that ended their Cold War alliance in the early 1960s; one of them must put on the ugly tights and play second-banana Robin to the other, not an easy thing to swallow for such nationalistic empires.
Likewise, there are no common civilizational ties between the three. The Islamic fundamentalists in Tehran are not overly enamored with either the godless Communists who run China or the Orthodox Christians in charge of Russia. Do the three share ammunition when they can and broadly support one another diplomatically? Sure. Is this SPECTRE, coherently plotting out world domination as if they were running a board meeting? Hardly.
And if the Bond villains are not nearly as coherent as advertised, neither are the three current crises of equal importance to America. As I outline in my new book, The Last Best Hope: A History of American Realism, primary US interests can be defined geo-strategically with some precision. ‘The Roosevelt Rule’ holds that, as anyone who has ever played Risk knows, the primary Eurasian landmass is the key to world domination. It has by far the most people, land, resources, ports, and wherewithal located on its world-island. Mighty as the United States is, its domination of the western hemisphere makes it peripheral to any power who controls either Europe or Asia. As such, and as FDR understood so brilliantly in World War II, no other great power must be allowed to dominate either Europe or Asia. If the Roosevelt rule is upheld, America will retain its leading role in the world. If it is upended, it will not.
Looked at through the geo-political prism, Ukraine emerges as nothing more than a strategic sideshow. After 18 months of World War I-style stalemate, neither side is ‘winning’ the war; nor are they likely to do so in the medium-term. The hysterical notion that, once victorious, Russia will push onto invading NATO countries is belied by what should be the obvious reality of Russian weakness. The Kremlin cannot upend Ukraine, let alone serious powers like Germany, France, Poland, and Italy. To put it mildly, the bloodied Red Army is not about to head off to the English Channel. The war is nothing more than a third order US interest.
Gaza is different in that the United States has a special relationship with Israel, as it does with few other countries (though the UK springs to mind as another example). As such, giving the Israeli government the means to replenish its Iron Dome defenses, plus vital artillery shells, shared intelligence, and diplomatic support around the globe makes eminent sense. This is an important American interest, even if the outcome does not imperil the Roosevelt rule.
Taiwan is more important still. China under Xi Jinping has made it crystal clear it is aiming to control Taiwan, by peaceful means or not. America ceding control of Taipei would upend its very favorable constellation of allies in the region by tarnishing US credibility. The US could well lose access to the vital higher end chip manufacturing that Taiwan presently dominates on a global scale, and all to its primary economic rival. These are serious interests that surely amount to a first order priority.
The vital Indo-Pacific also does certainly trigger the Roosevelt rule, as much of the world’s future economic growth and much of its future political risk are both lodged in this most important region for the future of the world. If China, already the primary trading partner with most of the Indo-Pacific, can escape being Geo-strategically hemmed in by the first island chain--America’s allies Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, down to India and the Strait of Malacca--which would be the result of taking charge of Taipei, it can sail unimpeded into the blue waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It would surely come to dominate first the Indo-Pacific, then Asia, and then—due to the Roosevelt Rule—the world. This is as momentous a strategic challenge as it gets.
Looked at with just a little intellectual rigor, then, the fanciful liberal hawk/neo-con notion of all these very different circumstances being conflated into one big thing is just that; a fairy tale for those looking for simple answers to complicated questions. Not only are the supposed pillars of this anti-American axis far from being coherent, but the circumstances underlying each crisis are of very different importance to America itself.
This is precisely where this huge analytical error becomes very, very dangerous. For to call something a world war triggers as a human response the most dangerous two words in the political risk lexicon: ‘Do something.’ The baleful magic trick is that by conflating the very different, specific American interests do not matter, every crisis is of equal, monumental importance, and the US must do everything, everywhere, all at once. At the best of times, this amounts to a recipe for imperial overstretch and American decline.
And, as it seems I must remind the ‘always intervene’ crowd, these are very much not the best of times. America is dealing with a fentanyl crisis that yearly is shockingly killing more of its citizens than died in the whole of the Vietnam War. Everyone knows our school systems are a mess, our infrastructure is dilapidated, and that crime is increasingly infesting our cities. Worse, we are an unimaginable $33 trillion (about $100,000 per person in the US) in debt, with the bond yield rising to five percent. If America is to remain a shining city on a hill, perhaps some of this should be attended to, rather than ruinously focusing on intervening everywhere all at once. For there is one ironclad lesson of history that the proponents of the World War III thesis are surely missing. Most great nations are destroyed from within.
--Dr. John C. Hulsman is president and managing partner of John C. Hulsman Enterprises, a global political risk firm. His new book, ‘The Last Best Hope: A History of American Realism,’ is available for pre-order on Amazon. https://www.amazon.com/Last-Best-Hope-History-American/dp/1915635640/ref=sr_1_1?
Hi Simon, I entirely agree; history teaches the political risk is in the mirror! Thanks, you toon; have a fab xmas! Fondly, John
Thank you, John. We have a terrible and dangerous habit of conflating the world to fit our preconceptions.
I have wondered for some time if China has the will and capacity to dominate the Indopacific even without America. Asia has been able to manage China throughout its history without the USA. I ask because I see more obstacles to China's hegemony than not. Among others, Multipolarity is a geographic fact, and putting together an acceptable order just in SEA would require China to dominate geography. To do this, China not only needs the hard power to do so but would have to appease/pacify deep-seated post-colonial nationalism that runs throughout SEA, a history of distrust and anti-Chinese sentiment, bridge the Islam/China divide, and come to terms, overcome the fact that communist ideology is repellant to much of SEA.
We should remember that most of the SEA rebuked China during the Cold War. Indonesia, strongly anti-communist and potentially anti-China again, did not reopen a Chinese embassy in Jakarta until 1990.
On a personal note, I witnessed the near destruction of Jakarta's Chinatown in 1998 during the Asian Financial Crisis. During economic downturns, much of SEA seeks out the Chinese as scapegoats.
Malaysia, too, has a history of anti-Chinese rioting.
Our mistake in influencing SEA is in part due to our liberal hegemonists framing the China/USA competition as a struggle between authoritarianism and Democracy, which Southeast Nations reject as a black-and-white Western implant that has no bearing on the realities of SEA. And, to propose such is divisive itself.
Anyway, a couple of thoughts.
Tom Raquer